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Abstract—Two crucial issues to the success of participatory
sensing are (a) how to incentivize the large crowd of mobile
users to participate and (b) how to ensure the sensing data to be
trustworthy. While they are traditionally being studied separately
in the literature, this paper proposes a Simple Endorsement Web
(SEW) to address both issues in a synergistic manner. The key idea
is (a) introducing a social concept called nepotism into participatory
sensing, by linking mobile users into a social “web of participants”
with endorsement relations, and (b) overlaying this network with
investment-like economic implications. The social and economic
layers are interleaved to provision and enhance incentives and
trustworthiness. We elaborate the social implications of SEW,
and analyze the economic implications under a Stackelberg game
framework. We derive the optimal design parameter that maxi-
mizes the utility of the sensing campaign organizer, while ensuring
participants to strictly have incentive to participate. We also design
algorithms for participants to optimally “sew” SEW, namely to
manipulate the endorsement links of SEW such that their economic
benefits are maximized and social constrains are satisfied. Finally,
we provide two numerical examples for an intuitive understanding.
Index Terms—Nepotism, crowdsourcing, human-centric comput-
ing, web of participants, social networks, altruism, beneficiary
effect, witness effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
The booming smartphone industry has stimulated partici-
patory sensing as a new sensing paradigm which primarily
harnesses the sensors on handheld mobile devices to perform
sensing tasks that were traditionally done by wireless sensor
networks or that were not even possible. It features pervasive-
ness, large scale and low cost, and has hence found a wide
range of applications in transportation [1], [2], environment [3],
lifestyle [4], healthcare [5], and so on.
However, whether participatory sensing will be viable criti-
cally depends on two key issues: incentive and trustworthiness.
The former refers to providing motivation for the public crowd
to participate in the sensing campaigns and the latter refers
to ensuring participants to contribute good quality sensing
data; in essence, both issues arise from the fact that data is
crowdsourced from the general public. While there is a sizable
body of prior work [6]–[14] dedicated to addressing these two
issues (usually separately), a common feature of these studies
is that participants are treated individually—there is no explicit
interaction among participants.
In this paper, we take a new, social-economic approach by
(a) exploiting the incumbent social relationships among mobile
users and (b) overlaying investment-like economic relationships
over the social linkages, to provision and enhance both incentive
and trustworthiness in a synergistic manner. Precisely, we pro-
pose a Simple Endorsement Web (SEW), a web of participants
in which participants endorse one another, out of two sources
of motivation: economically, they aim to maximize their own
economic benefit by (optimally) selecting whom to endorse and
whom to be endorsed by; socially, they are driven by nepotism
which is a notion that we first incorporate into crowdsourcing
(which subsumes participatory sensing) and is elaborated below.
In the vast literature, humans are commonly assumed to be
either selfish (self-interested) or altruistic in general. Taking
a somewhat conservative, but more realistic view, we would
rather think of people to be nepotic [15]: humans do help one
another but such benevolence is often confined to a particular
group of people whom they actually care about. This group may
consist of their families, some friends, colleagues, bosses, and
even their favorite celebrities. In the context of participatory
sensing, we particularly note that nepotism may potentially
constitute a strong source of motivation by forming an ideology
of “working for others and especially your cared ones”. Indeed,
it has been widely evidenced in both real life and the literature
that people often work harder for their loved or cared ones
than for themselves alone; psychologically, from doing so, they
can develop a sense of nobleness as opposed to merely being
egoistic [16].
Furthermore, we identify and exploit another impact of nepo-
tism in addition to providing incentive: enhancing trustworthi-
ness. The underlying rationale is that, although a participant
might generate fake or noisy data, either by sabotage or by mis-
take, he tends to refrain from doing so if (a) such conducts may
be witnessed by other people and especially his acquaintances,
and/or (b) his cared ones have to bear the consequences, such as
compromised benefit. Such a witness effect and beneficiary effect
have the potential to incentivize participants to improve the
quality of their contribution. Psychologically speaking, nepotism
helps inculcate a sense of responsibility and accountability in
participants to achieve more trustworthy participatory sensing
systems.
On the other hand, solely relying on these social implications
derived from nepotism puts the stakeholder at risk, as social
linkages are implicit, intangible, and less binding, and are
challenged by weak social ties. Therefore, we overlay this social
endorsement web with explicit and tangible economic relations,
where participants invest in one another and harvest returns like
stakeholders.
These constitute the first main contribution of this paper:
we design SEW which incorporates both the social and the
economic elements, as will be presented in Section III.978-1-4799-4657-0/14/$31.00 c￿ 2014 IEEE
The second main contribution is a formal analysis of the
economic implications of SEW as presented in Section IV.
Under a Stakelberg game framework, we solve the best-response
contribution strategy for each participant which leads to the
Nash equilibrium. We also derive in closed form the optimal
design parameter for SEW that maximizes the utility of the
sensing campaign organizer. Moreover, we show that SEW
strictly satisfies individual rationality (IR) which means that
participants strictly have incentive to participate in the cam-
paign.
Our third main contribution is answering the key question
of how to optimally “sew” SEW. That is, how each participant
manipulates the endorsement links by deciding whom to endorse
and whom to be endorsed by, such that his economic benefit is
maximized while his social preferences are simultaneously satis-
fied. Section V fulfills this purpose by providing each participant
with algorithmic solutions which automate the “sewing” process
and thereby significantly simplify the operation of SEW.
Section VI illustrates the above optimal-decision making
algorithms and evaluates our analysis of economic implications
using two numerical examples. Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
In September 2012, LinkedIn rolled out an endorsement
option for its users to endorse and recognize the skills of
their professional connections [17]. However, there is no actual
commitment involved or consequence to be borne, and therefore
users can perform the action arbitrarily. As a result, LinkedIn
endorsement has been quoted to be “way too easy” [18] and
received an overwhelming volume of criticisms [19]. In con-
trast, SEW ties participants closely with explicit and tangible
economic benefit as well as corroborated social implications,
and as such endorsement hereof is not an arbitrary decision but
involves rigorous strategy optimization.
Incentive design has been extensively studied in economics
and recently attracted substantial attention from the participatory
sensing research community. Lee and Hoh [6] proposed a
dynamic-pricing based incentive scheme using reverse auctions,
in which participants bid their desired prices to sell their sensing
data to the campaign organizer. Yang et al. [7] studied two
incentive models: a platform-centric model where the platform
allocates a total reward to users in proportion to their planned
sensing times, and a user-centric model where each user declares
a set of tasks to complete together with his desired payment,
after which the platform will select a set of users to perform the
tasks and pay them with no lower than their declared payments.
Koutsopoulos [9] designed an auction in which users declare
their unit costs and the service provider (organizer) determines
users’ participation levels (e.g., data sampling rates) as well
as their payments in order to minimize total payment subject
to a given quality of service. Luo and Tham [8] proposed
a market-based incentive scheme using a demand-and-supply
model, in which participants are not only data suppliers but
also service consumers who demand information service provi-
sioned from processing the contributed data. Luo et al. [10]
designed an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions
with a contribution-dependent prize; the model is tailored to
accommodate realistic participatory sensing contexts such as
uncertain population size, unknown user types, and risk aversion
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Figure 1: A SEW-based participatory sensing system.
of users. All these prior studies treat participants individually,
whereas SEW links them together to take advantage of the
mutual influence among users.
For general networked systems, Lottree (lottery tree) [20] was
proposed as an incentive scheme to recruit users. It arranges
users in a tree according to who (a parent node) has recruited
whom (child nodes), and conducts a lottery where a user gets
higher chance to win if he has recruited more users. SEW
differs significantly from Lottree firstly in its graph structure
instead of a tree. Second and more importantly, each branch
in Lottree is determined at the time a user joins the tree
(and henceforth fixed permanently), and the user is given no
room to choose his parent node; on the contrary, SEW allows
participants to manipolate or “sew” the endorsement web based
on their respective contribution and endorsement performance,
thereby permitting flexibility and strategy optimization. Third,
SEW formally embodies the idea of “working for your cared
ones” which is absent in all related prior work.
To address the trustworthiness issue in participatory sensing,
Wang et al. [13] took a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
approach to discover truth from multiple observations. It as-
sumes that most users will submit multiple different reports
for the same object and some users will repeat the same
report multiple times, neither of which is assumed by SEW.
Also, it deals with binary reports only whereas SEW handles
general cases. [14] proposed a trust framework to find candidate
participants for sensing tasks, by evaluating the suitability of
candidates using information published on social media, such as
expertise and education background, which is clearly different
from this work. [11] and [12] made an attempt to tackle the
issue by using Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which involves
hardware modification; in addition, the trustworthiness thereof
refers to protecting data integrity against malicious users, which
is not the quality of data in the general sense.
III. DESIGN OF SEW
A SEW-based participatory sensing system is depicted in
Fig. 1 with an operational timeline. SEW is application-agnostic
and works with any type of sensor readings (scalar, vector, etc.)
and modalities.
A SEW is a directed graph (or simply digraph) W = (N , E)
that consists of a set N of participants and a set E of endorse-
ment links, where a link (i, j) ∈ E represents that i endorses
j for some i, j ∈ N . A participant may take the role of (a)
a contributor, who submits sensory data from his smartphone
to a central server via a mobile app, or (b) an endorser, who
endorses contributors, or (c) both. Each participant can endorse,
and be endorsed by, multiple participants except himself.
A. Endorsement Setup and Revocation
SEW requires bilateral agreement when setting up endorse-
ment: one participant i must initiate a “Request To Endorse”
(RTE) or “Request to Be Endorsed by” (RBE) message to
another participant j, and the endorsement is only set up if
j approves the request. This is an asynchronous non-blocking
process: all requests will be queued up until the requested
participant approves or rejects the requests. On the contrary,
revoking endorsement is unilateral: either i or j can terminate
their endorsement relationship without seeking approval from
the other party.
B. Power Transfer
Each participant possesses two power attributes:
• Contribution Power (CP): a number indicating the partici-
pant’s contribution performance, earned through making con-
tributions.
• Endorsing Power (EP): a number indicating the participant’s
endorsement performance, earned through endorsing other
contributors.
A key feature of SEW is that EP is transferable: an endorser
i automatically lends his EP, in an amount of EPi|N outi | , to each
of his endorsed contributors who are collectively denoted by
N outi . That is (and as a result), each contributor k automatically
receives from his endorsers, who are collectively denoted by
N ink , a borrowed power of
BPk =
￿
i∈N ink
EPi
|N outi |
. (1)
Power transfer takes effect in a reward scheme described below.
C. Reward Scheme
Participants who make contributions will receive reward as
per batches: depending on the application, a batch can be a
preset period of time (as in Fig. 1), a geographic region, a
spatiotemporal combination of both, or a specific number of
submissions. Upon collecting a batch of contributions from par-
ticipants Nc, the server determines a reward for each contributor
k ∈ Nc according to the following reward function:
r(k,q,CP,W) :=
qαk [CPk(1 + wk)]
β￿
j∈Nc q
α
j [CPj(1 + wj)]
β
R (2)
or rk in short. A contributor k then accrues to his CP as per
CPk ← CPk + rk. (3)
In (2), q = (q1, ..., qm) is a quality vector in which qk ≥ 0
is the quality1 of sensing data sent by contributor k, CP =
1Quality in this paper bears general semantics; it could be accuracy, res-
olution, timeliness, relevancy, etc., depending on the specific application and
sensor modality. It could also be as sophisticated as a cumulative metric that
accommodates multiple contributions from the same participant. A detailed
discussion can be found in [21].
(CP1, ..., CPm) is the CP vector,W = (w1, ..., wm) is a vector
of power-transfer coefficients in which wk characterizes how
much power was transferred from k’s endorsers to k, such that
CPk(1+wk) is k’s effective power in competing for the reward.
A possible form of wk is2
wk =
BPk
BPk + CPk
. (4)
The two elasticity indexes α,β ∈ (0, 1] allow the campaign
organizer to prioritize between the (intrinsic) sensor quality and
the (extrinsic) contributor credibility connoted by his power, and
R is the constant total reward for the current batch.
Upon joining the sensing campaign, a participant will have
his CP and EP initialized as an insignificant positive value.
Revenue Sharing: Power transfer enables participants to act
like stakeholders investing their EP in one another. Conversely,
each participant would expect a return of investment (ROI), for
which we introduce a revenue sharing scheme as follows. In
addition to rk, SEW allocates certain appreciation power (AP)
for each contributor and redistribute it among all his endorsers,
as an appreciation of their endorsements. Specifically, APk =
ρkrk will be allocated, where
ρk :=
￿ wk
1 + wk
￿β
, (5)
for contributor k to redistribute to k’s endorsers such that each
endorser i ∈ N ink receives a share ηikρkrk, i.e.,
EPi ← EPi +
￿
k∈N outi
ηikρkrk, (6)
where the summation is due to the multiple contributors that
endorser i may be endorsing, and ηik is the revenue sharing
ratio defined as
ηik :=
EPi
|N outi |BPk
(7)
which indicates the power that endorser i lends to contributor
k (i.e., EPi|N outi | ) relative to k’s total borrowed power (i.e., BPk).
Ultimately, a participant in SEW has multiple sources of
income: reward rk as a contributor (cf. (3)) and multiple shares
of AP as an endorser (cf. (6)).
D. Power Redemption
CP and EP are redeemable in monetary terms. For each
reward batch, the system determines two exchange rates, xc
and xe, to convert each participant’s CP and EP earned in
this batch, into monetary values, respectively. These are then
deposited into participants’ respective private accounts for them
to cash out anytime. The optimal exchange rates are determined
in Section IV.
Operational considerations: Since power redemption follows
the same cycle of batches (e.g., hourly), the system has the
flexibility to reinitialize power attributes (CP and EP) at the end
2In accordance with intuition, we only require wk to be an increasing and
concave function in BPk and satisfy wk(0) = 0. Most of our results hold in
principle regardless of the specific form of wk , while we use (4) mainly for
calculating numerical results. One merit of using (4), though, is that it caps
wk below 1 and therefore prioritizes CP over BP, which concurs with our
philosophy that contribution is the bread and butter of participatory sensing
while endorsement is an auxiliary instrument.
of any batch, without being concerned about any unredeemed
power. Thus the system can keep participants’ track records up-
to-date, for example by associating a sliding window (in the size
of, say, a week or month) with each participant so that only his
most recently earned power is recorded whereas old record is
nullified. This also benefits recruiting new participants, because
otherwise newcomers will face the challenge of competing with
overly powerful veterans.
E. Social Implications
We summarize two social implications from SEW design.
Beneficiary effect: The revenue sharing scheme essentially
renders endorsers beneficiaries of their endorsed contributors.
This promotes a sense of nobleness in contributors as they
are now working altruistically rather than egoistically, which
potentially constitutes a strong source of motivation (for both
contribution quantity and quality). In addition, this beneficiary
effect may also motivate participants to recruit their cared or
loved ones to join as their endorsers (beneficiaries), thereby
expanding the participant pool.
Witness effect: The system can choose to inform endorsers
of their endorsed contributors’ contribution performance or
even the content of contribution (subject to privacy settings).
This essentially associates each contributor with witnesses who
may as well be his acquaintances, thereby inculcating a sense
of accountability and responsibility in the contributor, which
mitigates producing fake data and fosters trustworthiness.
IV. OPTIMAL CONTRIBUTION AND REWARD STRATEGIES
This section analyzes the economic implications of SEW. The
problem is stated as follows. At the beginning of each reward
batch, the organizer announces two exchange rates xc and xe
to be used to respectively convert CP and EP earned in this
batch into dollar values. Each participant i chooses a quality
qi to contribute for this batch, where qi = 0 indicates not to
contribute. The problem is thus to determine (a) xc and xe
for the organizer, and (b) qi for each participant, in order to
maximize their respective utilities.
A. Game Formulation
We model the above problem as a Stackelberg game, where
the leader is the organizer who takes the first move—announces
exchange rates—and the followers are the participants who
take the second move—determine contribution qualities. All
are players who aim to maximize their respective utilities. The
utility of the organizer is defined as
u0 = x0 log(1 +
￿
k∈N
qk)− xcR− xe
￿
k∈N
ρkrk (8)
where x0 > 0 is exogenously given which converts user
contributions to the real cash value perceived by the organizer,
the log term reflects the diminishing marginal return from
the aggregate user contribution,3 R is the total reward for all
contributors (to accrue to their CP), and
￿
k ρkrk is the total
AP to be redistributed to all the endorsers (to accrue to EP).
3Alternatively,
￿
k log(1 + qk) can be used in place of
￿
k qk , yet the
problem remains the same in principle.
The utility of a participant i consists of two components, one
gained from contributing and the other from endorsing:
Contributing : uci = xcri − ci(qi), (9)
Endorsing : uei = xe
￿
k∈N outi
ηikρkrk. (10)
In (9), ci(·) is the individual cost function of i, assumed to be
increasing and satisfies ci(0) = 0 and c￿￿i (qi) ≥ 0. In (10), we
assume that endorsement does not incur perceivable cost. Thus,
a participant i’s utility is
ui = u
c
i + u
e
i = xcri − ci(qi) + xe
￿
k∈N outi
ηikρkrk. (11)
B. Equilibrium Analysis
To solve for the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, we use
backward induction. Supposing that xc and xe are given, we
analyze the Nash equilibrium strategy q∗i for each participant i.
To prioritize contribution (bread and butter) over endorsement
(auxiliary instrument), we assume xc > xe. To simplify nota-
tion, let Pi := CPi(1+wi). To simplify analysis, let α = β = 1.
First, expand (11) as
ui = xcR
qiPi￿
j∈N qjPj
− ci(qi) + xeR
￿
k∈N outi
ηikρk
qkPk￿
j∈N qjPj
= R
xcqiPi + xe
￿
k∈N outi ηikρkqkPk￿
j∈N qjPj
− ci(qi),
where j ∈ N is equivalent to j ∈ Nc since qj = 0 indicates
no contribution. Letting Q0 :=
￿
j∈N\{i} qjPj and Q
out
i :=￿
k∈N outi ηikρkqkPk, we have
ui = R
xcqiPi + xeQouti
Q0 + qiPi
− ci(qi),
∂ui
∂qi
= PiR
xcQ0 − xeQouti
(Q0 + qiPi)2
− c￿i(qi),
∂2ui
∂qi2
= −2P 2i R
xcQ0 − xeQouti
(Q0 + qiPi)3
− c￿￿i (qi).
We note that xeQouti < xcQ0 because (a) ηik ≤ 1 and ρk <
1, (b) N outi ⊆ N \ {i}, and (c) xe ≤ xc. In addition, since
c￿￿i (qi) ≥ 0, thus ∂
2ui
∂qi2
< 0 and ui is strictly concave. Therefore,
the maximizer of ui can be uniquely determined using the first-
order condition to be
q˜i =
￿
R
Piti
￿
xcQ0 − xeQouti
￿− Q0
Pi
where ci(qi) is instantiated by ci(qi) := tiqi, ti > 0, a
commonly used linear cost model. As a participant will not
contribute if q˜i ≤ 0, the best-response strategy of i, denoted by
qˆi(q−i), is thus
qˆi =
0, if xcQ0 − xeQouti ≤
Q20ti
PiR
;￿
R
Piti
￿
xcQ0 − xeQouti
￿− Q0Pi , else. (12)
Given the best-response strategy (12), the Nash equilibrium
q∗ = (q∗1 , ..., q∗|N |) can be computed using either a simplicial
method [22] or a differentiable homotopy [23].4
The above analysis holds regardless of whether there will be
any endorsement setup or revocation in the current reward batch,
because the system can choose to effect topology changes only
at the end of each batch. Also, the analysis assumes that all the
participants’ CP, EP and BP are anonymously known to each
participant,5 which is clearly feasible in a real system and is
not privacy-intrusive.
C. Organizer Utility Maximization
While the preceding subsection deals with the follower stage
of the Stackelberg game, this subsection deals with the leader
stage to determine the optimal exchange rates xc and xe such
that the organizer’s utility u0 is maximized.
We assume without loss of generality that xe = ￿xc, 0 <
￿ < 1. Plugging rk (2) into (8), we reformulate the organizer’s
problem as
maximize: x0 log(1+
￿
k∈N
q∗k)−xcR
￿
1+￿
￿
k∈N
ρk
q∗kPk￿
j∈N q
∗
jPj
￿
where we note that q∗k is a function of xc. This optimization
problem can be solved using standard methods such as Newton’s
method [24]. In order to obtain explicit expressions, consider a
homogeneous reference model where all players have the same
CP, EP, cost function t ·q, and each player endorses dout, and is
endorsed by din, other players. It is easy to prove that dout =
din,6 and thus the Nash equilibrium can be expressively written,
according to the best response (12), as
q∗i =
R
n2t
[(n− 1)xc − ρxe], ∀i ∈ N , (13)
where ρ = EP2EP+CP and n = |N |. Note that (13) does not
depend on din or dout because each player has BP = din ·
EP
dout = EP . Therefore, the organizer’s utility is
u0 = x0 log
￿
1 +
n− 1− ￿ρ
nt
xcR
￿− (1 + ￿ρ)xcR
⇒ ∂u0
∂xc
=
x0
n−1−￿ρ
nt R
1 + n−1−￿ρnt xcR
− (1 + ￿ρ)R,
∂2u0
∂xc2
= − x0(
n−1−￿ρ
nt )
2R2
(1 + n−1−￿ρnt xcR)
2
< 0.
Therefore, u0 is strictly concave in xc. However, since
u0|xc=0 = 0, it must be satisfied that ∂u0∂xc |xc=0 > 0 for u0
to have positive values. This leads to
x0 >
nt(1 + ￿ρ)
n− 1− ￿ρ . (14)
4Simplicial methods solve a non-linear equilibrium problem by solving a
piecewise linear approximation of the problem. On the other hand, a differen-
tiable homotopy exploits the differentiability structure that is present in games.
Both algorithms have been shown to converge to Nash equilibrium for a generic
n-person game.
5To elaborate, the set of power attributes of all the users are commonly known,
but users are not able to associate any particular user with his power attributes,
except that each endorser knows his endorsed contributors’ respective power
attributes (which is reasonable and natural). In any case, user identities are not
disclosed without user permission.
6In a digraph, the total outdegree |N |dout equals the total indegree |N |din.
Now we can apply the first-order condition to obtain the unique
maximizer of u0, as
x∗c =
x0
(1 + ￿ρ)R
− nt
(n− 1− ￿ρ)R (15)
which achieves the organizer’s maximum utility
u∗0 = x0
￿
log
x0(n− 1− ￿ρ)
nt(1 + ￿ρ)
− 1￿+ nt(1 + ￿ρ)
n− 1− ￿ρ . (16)
D. Incentive for Participation
Given that the organizer achieves the maximum utility, it is
of interest to know if participants have incentive to participate.
This requires satisfying individual rationality (IR), which means
that the expected utility of each participant must be nonnegative
at equilibrium.
To this end, we calculate ui at the equilibrium for all i, using
(11) with the results obtained from Section IV-C, and obtain
with some algebraic manipulation that
ui =
1 + (n+ 1)￿ρ
n2
x∗cR (17)
which is strictly positive. This proves that SEW (strictly)
satisfies IR; in other words, participants strictly have incentive
to participate.
V. OPTIMAL ENDORSEMENT STRATEGIES
To put SEW into practice, it is key to answer the question of
how a participant decides on whom to endorse and whom to be
endorsed by, i.e., how to “sew” the SEW.
Recall that setting up endorsement requires bilateral agree-
ment which consists of two stages: request and approval. The
major difference between the two stages is that the request
stage is an “attempting” stage whereas the approval stage nails
down the actual relation. Hence we focus on providing optimal
solutions to the approval stage (Section V-A,V-B), yet give
guidelines to the request stage.
In the request stage, a contributor who looks for endorsers
should send the RBE requests to two sets of participants: (a)
from a social perspective, those whom he wants to benefit by
sharing his revenue with (regardless of their power values), and
(b) from an economic perspective, those who can lend him
the highest prospective7 supporting power, EPi|N outi |+1 , in order
to elevate his BP.
On the other hand, an endorser who looks for contributors
should send RTE requests to two other sets of participants:
(a) based on his knowledge gained from social acquaintance,
those who he believes to be “good” (active and trustworthy)
contributors, and (b) those k ∈ N who have the highest
prospective profitability with respect to him, say i, defined as
π+ik := η
+
ikρ
+
k q
α
k [CPk(1 + w
+
k )]
β , (18)
which is self-explanatory by combining (6) and (2), and where
the superscript ‘+’ indicates the prospective version of each
corresponding variable (cf. (7),(5),(4)): η+ik =
EPi
(|N outi |+1)BP+k
in which BP+k = BPk +
EPi
|N outi |+1 (i.e., BP incremented by
7The power is called “prospective” because one can only expect to receive it
after being endorsed by this requestee.
Figure 2: Endorsers’ problem: illustration of formulation (19).
power lent from i), ρ+k =
w+k
1+w+k
, w+k =
BP+k
BP+k +CPk
, qk is based
on historical (e.g. the most recent) contribution.
In terms of implementation, the system can provide two
sorted lists for the two prospective metrics, respectively, to
facilitate participants to find candidate endorsers or contributors.
They can then send RTE and RBE requests which will be
queued up at their respective recipients until being acted upon
(approved or rejected).
A. Optimal Decision for Endorsers
In the approval stage, an endorser checks his RBE notification
queue and needs to decide which requests to approve and which
to reject (ignore).
Problem statement: Given a set C of contributors who are
soliciting for endorsement, an endorser is to determine a subset
N out ⊆ C to endorse such that his economic payoff (10) is
maximized, subject to the social constraint that he will endorse
his socially preferred acquaintances in C, denoted by N soc. To
formulate, the endorser is to determine
N ∗out := argmaxN out⊆C
￿
k∈N out
π˜k, s.t. N soc ⊆ N out,
(18) where π˜k is the profitability of contributor k when N out,
the endorser’s endorsing set, is uncertain; it can be understood
as ηkρkrk as similar to (18), while its precise definition will be
given shortly in (20). Here we drop the subscript i as we will
be dealing with a single endorser throughout this section (V-A)
and hence no ambiguity will arise. Without loss of generality,
we let C include this endorser’s existing endorsed contributors,
and as such the outcome entails both setups and revocations.
To solve the problem, we reformulate it as an unconstrained
problem by letting N ∗out = N soc ∪N ∗ and finding N ∗ instead:
N ∗ := argmax
N˜⊆N soc
￿
k∈N˜∪N soc
π˜k (19)
where N soc := C \ N soc, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
To ease exposition below, denote
n0 := |N soc|, n1 := |N soc|, n˜ := |N˜ |.
The brute-force solution is: for each of the 2n1 subsets N˜ ⊆
N soc, calculate the sum of π˜k over all k ∈ N˜ ∪ N soc, and
then choose the maximum of the 2n1 sums. This amounts to a
computation time of
￿n1
k=0
￿n1
k
￿
(n0 + k) + 2n1 = (n0 +
n1
2 +
1)2n1 , using the formula
￿n1
k=0 k
￿n1
k
￿
= n12n1−1. This signals
an exponential increase of complexity which is undesirable.
Our solution is based on two key observations. First, let us
express π˜k by referring to (18) and plugging in ηk, ρk, wk, as8
π˜k =
qαkCP
β
k δ˜EP
CPk + 2BPk + 2δ˜EP
￿
2− 1
CPk +BPk + δ˜EP
￿β
(20)
where δ˜EP := EPn0+n˜ in which n0+ n˜ is the prospective number
of contributors to endorse. From this, we observe that AP+k
does not depend on a chosen N˜ per se but the cardinality
of N˜ , as well as k’s other attributes (qk, CPk, BPk) which
are independent of N˜ . Hence, we can equivalently write AP+k
as AP+k (n˜) and, for each k, obtain all its n1 + 1 values
(since n˜ = 0...n1) regardless of the 2n1 possible subsets
N˜ ⊆ N soc. The second observation is drawn from finding the
maximum of all the
￿
k∈N˜∪N soc AP
+
k , each being a sum over
all possible k’s, for a fixed n˜. Finding this “local” maximum
(as compared to the “global” maximum which is among all
n˜ = 0...n1) involves calculating and comparing all the
￿n1
n˜
￿
combinations of contributor k’s AP+k , leading to a complexity
of
￿n1
n˜
￿
(n˜ + n0). However, a more efficient way is to take
advantage of the fact that the local maximum must be achieved
by the n˜ contributors with the largest AP+k among all the n1
contributors, and to find these n˜ largest values we can use a
highly efficient partial sorting [25] algorithm with complexity
Θ(n1 + n˜ log n˜) [26], which results in a much lower overall
complexity Θ(n1 + n˜ log n˜) + n˜+ n0.
The pseudo-code of our solution is given by Algorithm 1. It
acts on behalf of an endorser to decide his optimal portfolio
of contributors to endorse, given his socially preferred acquain-
tances N soc specified by himself as input. Iterating over all n˜
and in each iteration, the algorithm first calculates AP+k for all
the requesting contributors and divide them into two lists, Lsoc
and Lsoc. Next, it finds the largest n˜ elements in Lsoc using our
adapted version of partial quicksort [26] which is asymptotically
the fastest partial sorting algorithm. These largest n˜ elements are
then summed together with all the n0 elements of Lsoc, which
is the local maximum. The global maximum is then obtained
by comparing all the local maxima.
Algorithm 1 Endorser’s decision: Constructing the optimal
portfolio of contributors
Input: C, N soc
Output: N ∗out
1: N ∗ ← ∅, Ymax ←
￿
k∈N soc AP
+
k |n˜=0
2: for n˜ = 1→ n1 do
3: Compute AP+k (n˜) for all k ∈ C using (20)
4: Lsoc ← {AP+k (n˜)|k ∈ N soc},Lsoc ← {AP+k (n˜)|k ∈ N soc}
5: Lind =PartialQuickSort(Lsoc, 1, n1, n˜)
6: Yn˜ ←
￿n0
i=1 Lsoc[i] +
￿n˜
i=1 Lsoc[i]
7: if Yn˜ > Ymax then
8: Ymax ← Yn˜
9: N ∗ ← Lind[1..n˜]
10: end if
11: end for
12: return N ∗ ∪N soc
8If k is an existing contributor, BPk will be replaced by BPk − EP|Nout| ,
i.e., as if he were a “new” contributor not endorsed by the endorser.
Function 2 PartialQuickSort(L, left, right, k)
Output: L[1..k] stores the largest k numbers (unordered) of L,
and Lind[1..k] their corresponding indexes (pseudo-code for
the latter is omitted for being nonessential)
1: if right > left then
2: pNew ← Partition(L, left, right)
3: if pNew > left+ k then
4: PartialQuickSort(L, left, pNew − 1, k)
5: else if pNew < left+ k then
6: PartialQuickSort(L, pNew + 1, right, left+ k −
pNew − 1)
7: end if
8: end if
9: return Lind
Function 3 Partition(L, left, right)
Output: pvtNew which satisfies that L[left..pvtNew-1] >
L[pvtNew] ≥ L[pvtNew..right]
1: pvt ← SelectPivot(L, left, right) //select an index be-
tween left and right, either randomly or using the median
2: pV al← L[pvt]
3: swap L[pvt] and L[right] //move pivot to the end
4: pvtNew ← left
5: for i = left→ right− 1 do
6: if L[i] > pV al then
7: swap L[i] and L[pvtNew]
8: pvtNew ← pvtNew + 1
9: end if
10: end for
11: swap L[pvtNew] and L[right]
12: return pvtNew
Proposition 1. The asymptotic average complexity of Algo-
rithm 1 is Θ(n21 log n1).
Proof: The computation time of lines 3 and 4 are both
Θ(n0 + n1), and that of line 6 is Θ(n0 + n˜). At line 5,
PartialQuickSort has an asymptotic average complexity of
Θ(n1 + n˜ log n˜) [26]. Therefore, the overall complexity of
Algorithm 1 is asymptotically
T =
n1￿
n˜=1
￿
2(n0 + n1) + (n1 + n˜ log n˜) + n0 + n˜
￿
=3n1(n0 + n1) +
n1(n1 + 1)
2
+
n1￿
n˜=1
n˜ log n˜.
To solve the last term, we use the Euler-Maclaurin for-
mula (21), where Bi’s are the Bernoulli numbers (B1,2,... =
− 12 , 16 , 0,− 130 , 0, 142 , 0, 130 ,...). The solution is derived in (22)
where C and C ￿ are constants (C = logA0 where A0 ≈ 1.28
is the Glaisher-Kinkelin constant). Thus,
T =
1
2
n21 log n1 +
13
4
n21 +
1
2
n1 log n1+
(3n0 +
1
2
)n1 +
1
12
log n1 +O(
1
n21
) + C.
Since n0 = |N soc| <∞, i.e., a socially preferred acquaintance
set is finite, T belongs to both O(n21 log n1) (i.e., T ≤ n21 log n1·
C1 for some C1) and Ω(n21 log n1) (i.e., T ≥ n21 log n1 ·C2 for
some C2). Hence, T = Θ(n21 log n1).
B. Optimal Decision for Contributors
A contributor checks his RTE queue and decides which
requests to accept or reject. Making this decision is relatively
easier than an endorser’s as in the preceding Section V-A,
because accepting more endorsers will only increase the con-
tributor’s BP and hence wk, and eventually his reward rk.
However, the definition of ηik (7) implies that increasing a
contributor’s BP will dilute each of his endorsers’ individual
share of appreciation power. Therefore, a contributor is subject
to two social constraints: (a) ensuring that among the requesting
endorsers, his preferred beneficiaries—which we denote by
N bnf—are accepted, (b) ensuring a subset N˚ bnf ⊆ N bnf ,
which contains those who are more “intimate” to him, to enjoy
a revenue sharing ratio of at least ηmin. To draw an analogy,
one can think of N bnf as the contributor’s relatives and N˚ bnf
as his family. Similarly, here we drop subscript k for brevity as
we are dealing with a single contributor only.
Now, denote the requesting endorsers by D, and similar to
Section V-A, let D include his existing endorsers. Further, define
δ+EP,i :=
EPi
|N outi |+1 .
9 The problem can be formulated as:
Determine N ∗in := argmax
N in⊆D
￿
i∈N in
δ+EP,i (23)
s.t. N bnf ⊆ N in,
δ+EP,j￿
i∈N in δ
+
EP,i
≥ ηmin, ∀j ∈ N˚ bnf . (24)
The inequality (24) can be understood by noting that BP =￿
i∈N in δ
+
EP,i.
The key idea of our solution is to convert the problem
into a standard combinatorial optimization, knapsack problem.
Notice in (24) that the smallest δ+EP,j in N˚ bnf determines the
upper bound of the total BP, and furthermore, the total BP is
lower bounded by all the δ+EP,i from N bnf . Following this,
the solution is given by Algorithm 4, in which the knapsack
procedure has a variety of available solution algorithms, e.g. the
Lua Knapsack solution [27]. In the case of BP cap < 0, there
is no solution and the contributor needs to either decrease ηmin
or shrink his beneficiary set N bnf or N˚ bnf .
Algorithm 4 Contributor’s decision: Constructing the optimal
portfolio of endorsers
Input: D, N bnf , N˚ bnf , ηmin
Output: N ∗in
1: Compute δ+EP,i for all i ∈ D
2: δminEP ← minj∈N˚ bnf δ+EP,j
3: BP all ← δminEP /ηmin
4: BP cap ← BP all −￿i∈N bnf δ+EP,i
5: if BP cap ≥ 0 then
6: return N bnf∪ Knapsack(BP cap, δ+EP,i|i∈D\N bnf )
7: else
8: return Nil
9: end if
9When i is k’s existing endorser, |N outi | will be replaced by |N outi | − 1,
i.e., as if he were a “new” requesting endorser of the contributor.
Euler-Maclaurin formula :
b￿
i=a
f(i) =
￿ b
a
f(x) dx+
f(a) + f(b)
2
+
∞￿
i=1
B2i
(2i)!
￿
f (2i−1)
￿
(b)− f (2i−1)￿(a)
￿
(21)
Let f(x) = x log x⇒
n1￿
n˜=1
n˜ log n˜ =
￿ n1
1
x log x dx+
n1 log n1
2
+ C ￿ +
log n1 + 1
12
+O(
1
n21
)
= C − n
2
1
4
+
n1(n1 + 1)
2
log n1 +
log n1
12
+O(
1
n21
) (22)
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Figure 3: Illustration of the evolution of a SEW. The tuple beside each node indicates (CP,EP) of the associated node. Nodes 4,5,7 sent requests
to be endorsed by node 1 who is the decision maker. The solid lines indicate endorsements and dotted lines indicate revocations.
VI. EVALUATION
To derive an intuitive understanding, we illustrate the sewing
process and our analysis using two examples.
A. Evolution of SEW
See Fig. 3(a) for an initial SEW, where node 1 has re-
ceived three RBE requests to endorse nodes 4,5,7, while it
is already endorsing nodes 2 and 6. Hence, the whole set
C = {2, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Suppose node 4 is node 1’s “socially
preferred acquaintance”. To make the optimal decision, node
1 simply tells the mobile app (which implements Algorithm 1)
thatN soc = {4} and the program will run and give the outcome,
which is depicted in Fig. 3(b). It shows that nodes 2 and 6 lose
the competition while nodes 5 and 7 win (besides node 4 who
is a sure winner).
To verify the result, Table I provides a sanity check where
three candidate sets are evaluated, and the underscored numbers
indicate the social node 4. Different values of π˜k are computed
according to (20). We can see that the set {4,5,7} is the most
profitable (i.e., generates the highest revenue) for node 1 and
is therefore selected. In fact, the three candidate sets shown in
Table I are the highest three among all the 24 = 16 candidate
sets.
Table I: Selecting from different combinations of contributors
Candidate Sets π˜k
￿
k π˜k{k|4, 5, 7} {7.5, 8, 7.78} 23.3
{k|4, 5, 6, 7} {6, 6.31, 4.28, 6.18} 22.8
{k|2, 4, 5, 6, 7} {1.9, 5, 5.22, 3.75, 5.12} 21.0
We remark on two intuitions. First, it is not true that “the
more people you endorse, the better off you will be”. Second,
it is worth noting that, node 2 is not selected although it has
the highest CP among all the nodes. While one can calculate
π˜2 = 1.9, the intuitive reason is that node 2 is endorsed by node
3 which is a very powerful node with EP3 = 80, and hence
node 3 will grab a significant share of revenue generated by
node 2, leaving node 1 in a disadvantaged position.
B. Economic implications
In line with the analysis in Section IV, we examine the or-
ganizer’s utility as well as the participants’ contribution quality
in equilibrium, with respect to participants’ three attributes: CP,
EP, and unit cost. The case is based on the reference model
thereof, instantiated by the parameters enumerated in Table II.
Table II: Parameters used in evaluation
Parameter Value
No. of participants 100
Range of CP; Default CP [1, 20] (step size: 1); 10
Range of EP; Default EP [1, 10] (step size: 1); 5
Range of unit cost t; Default t [0.01, 0.5] (step size: 0.025); 0.1
Others R = 1; x0 = 1; ￿ = 0.5; α = β = 1
We first plot the organizer’s utility u∗0 versus the partici-
pants’ CP and EP in Fig. 4, according to (16). We follow the
convention that the X-axis parameter takes its “Range” as in
Table II while the other two parameters take their “Default”
values as also in Table II. Fig. 4(a) and (b) demonstrate a
sharp contrast: u∗0 is increasing and concave in CP but is
decreasing and convex in EP. Although this could be explained
by examining the first and second-order derivatives of u∗0 with
respect to CP and EP, an intuitive understanding is of more
interest. For this purpose, note that the organizer gains utility
from revenue (contribution) and loses utility from cost which
consists of a fixed reward R for contributors and a variable
AP for endorsers (depending on how much power they lend
to contributors). When CP is higher, contributors rely more on
themselves and less on endorsers in competing for the reward,
and as a result less AP will be allocated. Therefore, the organizer
has more budget to increase the exchange rate xc so that xcR
values more. Since xc is announced beforehand, participants
are incentivized to contribute with higher quality, leading to
a higher organizer’s utility (partially due to the reduced AP
as well). Mathematically, the above can also be interpreted as:
CP ↑=⇒ ρ = EP2EP+CP ↓
(15)
=⇒ xc ↑ (13)=⇒ q ↑. The concavity is
partially due to the diminishing marginal return from aggregate
contributions (cf. (8)). Conversely, when EP is higher, more AP
has to be allocated, which adds to the cost of the organizer; in
the meantime, xc and hence q also drop for the similar reason
above. Consequently, the utility u∗0 decreases.
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Figure 4: Organizer’s utility u∗0 versus CP and EP.
Next, we examine the relation between equilibrium contribu-
tion quality q∗ and CP (resp. EP), as shown in Fig. 5. The trends
coincide with Fig. 4 and the explanation has been provided
above.
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Figure 5: Contribution quality q∗ versus CP and EP.
Lastly, we examine how unit cost affects organizer’s utility
and participants’ contribution quality in equilibrium, by plotting
(13) and (16) in Fig. 6. The results conform to the intuition that
higher cost drags down contribution quality (Fig. 6a), resulting
in the organizer’s declining utility (Fig. 6b).
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Figure 6: Impact of unit cost on q∗ and u∗0.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that ex-
plores nepotism in the context of networked computing; unlike
prior work which treats users individually, SEW links them
together as a “web of participants”. Nepotism is a key concept
that reflects humans’ multi-facet complexity rather than pure
rationality or altruism, and this paper explores it as a potentially
strong source of motivation for trustworthy crowdsourcing.
This work also represents the first effort to formulate and
interweave social and economic elements together into par-
ticipatory sensing: social motivation is reinforced by palpable
economic benefit while economic return is complemented by
social recognition.
While SEW themes around participatory sensing in this
paper, the core idea is applicable to human-centric networked
systems in general, including crowdsourcing, peer-to-peer, and
recommendation systems.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Thiagarajan, J. Biagioni, T. Gerlich, and J. Eriksson, “Cooperative
transit tracking using smart-phones,” in ACM SenSys, 2010, pp. 85–98.
[2] J. K.-S. Lau, C.-K. Tham, and T. Luo, “Participatory cyber physical system
in public transport application,” in Proc. CCSA, IEEE/ACM UCC, 2011.
[3] R. K. Rana, C. T. Chou, S. S. Kanhere, N. Bulusu, and W. Hu, “Ear-phone:
an end-to-end participatory urban noise mapping system,” in ACM/IEEE
IPSN, 2010, pp. 105–116.
[4] L. Deng and L. P. Cox, “Live compare: grocery bargain hunting through
participatory sensing,” in ACM HotMobile, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[5] B. Longstaff, S. Reddy, and D. Estrin, “Improving activity classification
for health applications on mobile devices using active and semi-supervised
learning,” in PervasiveHealth, 2010.
[6] J.-S. Lee and B. Hoh, “Sell your experiences: A market mechanism based
incentive for participatory sensing,” in IEEE PerCom, 2010.
[7] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Crowdsourcing to smartphones:
Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing,” in ACM Mobi-
Com, 2012.
[8] T. Luo and C.-K. Tham, “Fairness and social welfare in incentivizing
participatory sensing,” in IEEE SECON, June 2012, pp. 425–433.
[9] I. Koutsopoulos, “Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing
systems,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2013.
[10] T. Luo, H.-P. Tan, and L. Xia, “Profit-maximizing incentive for participa-
tory sensing,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2014.
[11] A. Dua, N. Bulusu, W.-C. Feng, and W. Hu, “Towards trustworthy
participatory sensing,” in 4th USENIX HotSec, 2009.
[12] P. Gilbert, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, and D. Wetherall, “Toward trustworthy
mobile sensing,” in ACM HotMobile, 2010.
[13] D. Wang, L. Kaplan, H. Le, and T. Abdelzaher, “On truth discovery in so-
cial sensing: A maximum likelihood estimation approach,” in ACM/IEEE
IPSN, 2012.
[14] H. Amintoosi and S. S. Kanhere, “A trust framework for social participa-
tory sensing systems,” in MobiQuitous, December 2012.
[15] D. Jones, “Group nepotism and human kinship,” Current Anthropology,
vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 779–809, December 2000.
[16] E. Sober and D. S. Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology
of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press, 1999.
[17] [Online]. Available: http://blog.linkedin.com/2012/09/24/
introducing-endorsements-give-kudos-with-just-one-click
[18] [Online]. Available: http://www.abmuku.com/2013/03/20/social-media/
linkedin-endorsements-are-way-too-easy/
[19] [Online]. Available: http://www.businessinsider.com/
linkedin-drops-endorsements-by-year-end-2013-3
[20] J. R. Douceur and T. Moscibroda, “Lottery trees: Motivational deployment
of networked systems,” in ACM SIGCOMM, 2007.
[21] C.-K. Tham and T. Luo, “Quality of contributed service and market
equilibrium for participatory sensing,” in IEEE DCOSS, 2013, pp. 133–
140.
[22] P. J.-J. Herings and A. van den Elzen, “Computation of the nash equilib-
rium selected by the tracing procedure in n-person games,” Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 89–117, 2002.
[23] P. J.-J. Herings and R. J. Peeters, “A differentiable homotopy to compute
nash equilibria of n-person games,” Economic Theory, vol. 18, pp. 159–
185, 2001.
[24] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004.
[25] J. M. Chambers, “ACM Algorithm 410: Partial sorting [M1],” Communi-
cations of ACM, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 357–358, May 1971.
[26] C. Martinez, “Partial quicksort,” in SIAM Workshop on Analytic Algorith-
mics and Combinatorics (ANALCO), 2004.
[27] S. Martello and P. Toth, Knapsack problems: Algorithms and computer
interpretations. Wiley, 1990.
